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1 Wrong Incentives from
Financial System Fixes
Stephen H. Haber and F. Scott Kieff
Few doubt the seriousness of the recent crisis afflicting thefinancial systems of the United States and the world. Fewclaim that nothing needs to be fixed. And few have missed
the major debates about what types of solutions are best—often
conducted at high volume, intensity, and frequency. So rather than
try to add to one side or the other of the well-rehearsed arguments
about each type of proposed reform, we try to refocus the analysis
on some core incentives: when the basic rules of the game are
changing, property rights and the rule of law are too ill-defined,
creating exactly the wrong incentives for investment and economic
growth. The wrong incentives created by repeated surges of bold
government action pose risks that have direct, short-term impacts,
which we fear have been seriously underexplored during both the
end of the Bush administration and the beginning of the Obama
administration. We hope that, by pointing out these risks, they can
be significantly mitigated at relatively low cost.
We begin by recommending a change to the general approach:
halt soon the introduction of new, bold programs. We are not say-
ing that nothing should be done; we are saying that it is important
in times like these for government to reach closure on its decisions
so that it can pick one set of rules of the game and then stick to
1
2 REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE
them. We then focus more narrowly on the process of structuring
workouts from bad deals and recommend avoiding approaches that
undermine bankruptcy. Bankruptcy allows the large group of pri-
vate professionals who are experts at restructuring or winding up
bad deals—consultants, financiers, lawyers, managers, and so
on—to get involved. Given the magnitude of the problem of toxic
assets, any solution to the current crisis will almost certainly need to
involve these private actors. We then explore how particular reform
proposals can be implemented without running afoul of the cau-
tions that are the focus of our effort. In the final analysis, we
applaud the Herculean efforts by so many serious thinkers in the
Bush and Obama administrations and outside government who
have thrown themselves into this important work in good faith and
with great sacrifice. All we can hope to add to the conversation are
these relatively easy-to-deploy (and important to deploy quickly)
tools for mitigating some vital but underappreciated risks with pro-
posed financial system fixes.
R P A
Four broad categories of approaches to solving the present crisis
have been either tried or proposed by the administrations of both
Bush and Obama, as well as by other countries facing similar prob-
lems today and in the past:
1. Let the markets and courts work it out, using institutions such
as foreclosure and bankruptcy directly or as a backdrop.
2. Have the government take over the banks and nationalize
them, taking control rights as well as cash flow rights. The
government then cleans the balance sheets by selling off toxic
assets, and re-privatizes the banks.
3. Have the government recapitalize the banks by injecting cash
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in exchange for preferred shares that have cash flow rights but
not formal control rights.
4. Have the government buy up the toxic assets in a special bank
or institution created for that purpose, leaving control rights
and cash flow rights in the hands of shareholders.
Most government rescue programs, including the one announced
in March by Treasury Secretary Geithner are hybrids of at least two
of these four broad strategies. While each strategy has advantages
and disadvantages, the second and fourth require the government
to act directly on markets as a buyer, seller, or manager of assets or
firms. Strategies two, three, and four also have an indirect effect on
markets in that the government is changing the underlying rules of
the game by changing various laws, regulations, or norms of prac-
tice. Which solution societies arrive at depends on their political
institutions. In the U.S. case, the problem facing political decision
makers is as follows:
If they let the markets and courts work it out, in time banks and
other financial intermediaries will foreclose on properties and those
foreclosed properties will be sold on markets. The problem is that
this solution involves a lot of pain for two groups: bank sharehold-
ers (who have to write down their capital) and voters (who have to
sit by while they are either forced out of their houses or watch the
market value of their homes plummet). Another risk is that a
change in the underlying psychology of consumers will develop a
logic all its own, resulting in a long-term recession much like the
one Japan suffered in the 1990s. This solution is therefore not polit-
ically acceptable—at least not to a government that wants to get
elected again.
The political dangers in having the government nationalize the
banks (strategy two) are several. First, the government can be
accused of socialism. Second, it is not clear that the government
actually has the statutory authority to nationalize banks or that it
can develop enough political support to make a fundamental
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change in that statutory authority. Third, if the plan winds up cost-
ing taxpayers trillions of dollars, the government will be the only
one to blame.
For option three, the buying of preferred shares, there await two
horns of a dilemma. On the one side lies the appearance that the
government has simply given away too much money while failing
to take control away from those seen as having contributed to the
underlying problem. On the other sides lies the reality that the gov-
ernment actually is taking a great deal of control, which is one rea-
son some banks have tried desperately to return the money they
received through the TARP program created by former Treasury
Secretary Paulson. Although the preferred stock may not convey
control rights as a formal matter, the ability to grant or withhold
future cash injections conveys a great deal of control. Control also
is wielded by the ongoing threat of shut down or other unfavorable
action in response to regulatory reviews like the stress tests, or by
the ongoing threat that any member of a bank’s leadership or rank
and file can be publicly called to the carpet regarding their compen-
sation package.
There is also a political and economic danger to solution four,
the government buying the toxic assets via an institution especially
created for that purpose. The basic problem is that the government
will inevitably pay more for the assets than their market value, for
at least two reasons. First, the owners of the assets (the banks) know
the quality of the assets better than the government. Second, the
government will have an incentive to pay a price as close to that
demanded by the bankers because, to the degree that the govern-
ment pays less than the book value, it will require the banks to write
down capital, in turn leaving the banks undercapitalized when the
process is done. This may mean, in turn, that the government
would have to undertake yet another rescue plan: to recapitalize the
banks by buying more shares.
Treasury Secretary Paulson’s solution was number four, which
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was politically viable for only three days. Treasury Secretary Geith-
ner’s plan is a combination of solutions one and four, but the gov-
ernment has already deployed solution three via the TARP
program. The end result is a curious hybrid. The government tries
to bring private market actors into the solution by giving investors
the opportunity to buy toxic assets. At the same time, most of the
financing for these transactions comes from the government, via an
equity match from the Treasury and via a loan from the FDIC.
Private actors bear some risk because they must put up part of the
capital and must service a loan from the government to cover much
of the rest, but they have the option of walking away from bad
assets because the loans are nonrecourse (they are collateralized
only by the assets being purchased). The government has also, how-
ever, taken preferred stock ownership stakes in the banks, via the
TARP program.
In short, there are a lot of moving parts to the government’s
approach. Not only can they work at cross purposes to one another,
but the high degree of ambiguity about whether the next govern-
ment action will target any particular margin creates a huge disin-
centive among market actors to invest in any particular direction.
A related concern with this hybrid set of strategies is that they
are so inherently burdened by the huge risks of the government
paying either too much or too little that they lead to the govern-
ment implementing its goals through a protracted series of moves.
As discussed more fully below, we think that whatever benefits may
come from getting the approach exactly right through careful titra-
tion are eclipsed by the risks of multiple rounds of bold actions.
The bottom line is that at least two key unintended consequences
follow when market actors come to expect that the government will
continue to change the institutions in an open-ended way. The first
is that the belief the government will step in again in the future
encourages moral hazard: private actors may take too much risk,
expecting to be bailed out in a future round of government action.
The second is that the belief the government will step in later may
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discourage private market actors from acting now, considering it
prudent to wait until the government provides an even more attrac-
tive program.
We think it can be fine for the government to focus on approaches
that facilitate coordination among private actors as the direct, first-
order effect, so long as it avoids approaches that will require further
qualitative shifts of the type that would cause overall uncertainty
about what the rules of the game will be. Although the uncertainty
created by successive deployment of bold moves may technically be
a second-order effect in that it is indirect, it is far too big to be
ignored.
T I  F M 
S R
Showing their determination to address the present crisis, President
Obama, Treasury Secretary Geithner, and Federal Reserve Chair-
man Bernanke have each proclaimed on several occasions, includ-
ing as recently as early March, that they will take whatever steps are
needed to help resolve the economic crisis. The message is in part
constructive in providing a calming effect on anxious people in
their roles as both citizens and market actors. But the message also
is in part destructive, especially against a backdrop of several
months of bold moves, going back to Paulson’s original plan of
direct government purchase of toxic assets in that it strongly sug-
gests that each round of moves is not the last.
This is a serious problem because when market actors think that
further significant changes are coming, they find it difficult to
engage in the commercial activity our economy needs for recovery.
A great deal of wealth still exists throughout the economy, in the
form of labor, money, tangible assets such as factories, equipment,
inventory, and real estate, and intangible assets such as securities,
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commercial paper, skills, and intellectual property. Further eco-
nomic activity requires that these wealth components be put to
work: that they be exchanged with one another through new com-
mercial activity. But many of those assets are waiting on the side-
lines. Many others are tied down in existing transactions that are
not doing well at the moment; but in order for them to be rede-
ployed, their deals must be unwound.
In normal times, deals are routinely made and modified to meet
the changing needs of the private actors involved in them, who are
remarkably adept at integrating new information and preferences
into deals when they can predict what the basic rules of the game
are likely to be. But bold government actions—and the expectation
of more such actions in the future—are game-changing events.
Some of these changes are the direct consequence of new laws and
regulations; others are a bit more subtle. When the government
spends vast sums of money on emergency programs, it has a huge
impact in the short run on relative costs for taking particular risks
and opportunities and, in the slightly longer run, on expectations
about tax rates, inflation, and the scope of government in the
future. The problem is that private actors have a difficult time tak-
ing the actions we need now when they think the rules of the
game—the laws, regulations, and contracting environment—are
likely to change in big ways. Such a paralysis affects those holding
assets that are ready to be deployed as well as those who own assets
tied up in bad deals.
Consider those who are holding assets that are ready to be
deployed. When facing the possibility of significant changes in tax
rates, enforceability of contracts, and available subsidies that the
government is presently employing and considering, every market
actor risks feeling like a patsy for diving into deals too soon to
successfully operate under the new rules. It might seem that the
government could employ the normal tools that private actors use
in deals to mitigate the anxieties of those among their counterpart-
ies who are early movers, such as committing to what deal-makers
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call ‘‘most favored nation clauses,’’ and the like. When a seller uses
a clause like this in a contract with a first buyer, the seller is con-
straining herself not to contract with any other buyer at a lower
price without also giving the first buyer that same low price. But
the government can’t make such commitments about its present
emergency financial actions for at least three reasons. First, it would
be difficult to figure out what commensurabilities, if any, exist
across the various programs on offer, which means it would be
almost impossible to determine whether everyone were being given
the same or a different deal. Second, even if the exchange rates
among such programs were determined, each program would then
have to be as expensive as the others, making their aggregate cost
enormous. Third, it is not clear that any market actor would bank
heavily on a government commitment to equal treatment, espe-
cially against the backdrop of rapidly changing behavior. After wit-
nessing Lehman Bros. not receiving the same bailout as AIG, one
would expect treatment to vary, not to hold constant.
A somewhat different set of problems faces those presently in
bad deals that must get unwound. Ironically, the expectation of
changes to the rules of the game causes strategic paralysis in any
party who thinks she or he is suffering particular economic trauma
from her present deal. In normal times, those involved in bad deals
have strong reasons to cut their losses and get out. But as new
bailouts, tax breaks, insurance, and other tools designed to mitigate
financial trauma are rolled out, those facing such trauma have large
incentives to stay in, hoping that if the mere passage of time won’t
bring a particular fix their way, then further trauma might.
Although all of the above argue that government leaders should
wrap up their actions sooner rather than later, we recognize that
there are important reasons for not doing so too soon. In some
cases, leaders may have wanted more internal vetting; in others they
may have wanted to test the applications of their actions; and in
others they may have figured that beginning with low amounts
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would avoid overpayments. We are not trying to fault our leaders
for taking such concerns seriously.
What we are trying to emphasize here is that political leaders
must not overlook, especially now, after several rounds of action,
that the benefits generated from those actions must be weighed
against the too often underexplored costs of having the market
think our leaders are likely to act further. Our leadership must bake
into their thinking the importance of credibly committing them-
selves to stop making further game-changing moves and then signal
that to the market so as to induce private actors to move much
faster in unwinding their bad deals and in forging new ones.
I T 
D  B
The problems of bad deals are particularly acute during difficult
times like these. A great number of ongoing deals have turned out
badly, as they either contributed to the downturn or were a result
of it. Despite ongoing debates about the direction of causation,
assigning blame may be less important to the economy as a whole
than the need to simply ensure that the resources tied up in these
deals are quickly put to higher and better uses. In addition, the
problems of bad deals will not go away. When new ventures are
launched, especially in such times of uncharted conditions, a great
number will fail, and the rules of the game must be structured so
as not to leave those assets sidelined and unable to contribute to
economic recovery.
Now, and for the foreseeable future, our society has a particularly
acute need for dealing well with failure. Professionals who are
highly trained, experienced, and skilled, who are particularly adept
at swooping into a failing or failed enterprise to turn things around
or at least wind things up most productively would do just the trick.
Specialized legal rules and organizations would provide the essential
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frameworks. The fortunate news is that our society has done a great
job in building both the professionals themselves as well as the legal
system associated with bankruptcy practice. The unfortunate news
is that so many of the present approaches to emergency action may
be tolling their death knell.
Like the members of any profession, those involved in turn-
around and windup are good at what they do. Their practice has
evolved over decades, supported by robust and diverse intellectual
and academic foundations and honed by richly competitive prac-
tice.
In contrast, politicians are not experts at dealing productively
with business failures. Yet many of the government actions taken
to steer failing ventures away from bankruptcy have crowded out
the experts our society has created to deal with such issues. Those
experts make their living by acting within and against the backdrop
of the bankruptcy system and thus have no reason to throw them-
selves into the mix when matters are being handled directly by the
government (nor do they have the power to act through these gov-
ernmental avenues). Some may be tempted to help, either out of
altruism or in hopes of earning a share of the value they contribute
to the rescue—such as taking salaries of a dollar a year with the
right to a bonus if they are able to turn a profit. But they may
ultimately be dissuaded by the real risk they face of being demon-
ized by the base populism some in government and the media have
recently directed toward some of those not involved in the private
sector’s failed decisions of the past who were asked to help save at
least the non-failed components of business to prevent the public
from having to take on even more risk.
At the same time, it makes little sense to favor the incumbents in
the failed businesses over those who specialize in turnaround and
windup. In some cases the incumbents have been poor custodians
of the enterprise, leading to its failure; in some cases some aspect
of the relationships among the incumbents—contractual or other-
wise—was just not working well enough to prevent the business
from failing. In other cases, there is no blame, but the incumbents’
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ability to add value to their enterprises will be much greater when
their enterprise is functioning rather than failing because their skill
sets are oriented for functioning enterprises. In all cases the present
failure situation provides strong reasons to favor including those
who are expert at the business of dealing productively with business
failure.
Not only do present emergency actions risk crowding out the
experts who deal most productively with business failure, but the
fact that government has provided alternatives to bankruptcy sig-
nificantly undermines the viability of the entire bankruptcy system.
Although, like any legal system, our system of bankruptcy laws and
courts is hugely imperfect, it has evolved significantly over the past
century so as to be highly adept at facilitating the smooth, deliber-
ate, and fair process of maintaining and distributing value. The
vitality of our bankruptcy system facilitates entry into risky enter-
prises by facilitating exit, and in turn facilitates re-entry as assets
are re-deployed. Bankruptcy provides all those who invest in an
enterprise—labor, management, shareholders, secured creditors,
general unsecured creditors, and so on—with a set of rules under
which they can expect to operate when the business gets reorga-
nized or wound up.
Extensive debates over many years have developed in the bank-
ruptcy system a range of methods for addressing the myriad con-
cerns facing the many constituencies. Yet no categorically new
concern or constituency has been brought forth to support the
present emergency alternatives to bankruptcy. This precedent
means that in the future almost any argument may be used to jus-
tify such a striking derogation from established bankruptcy prac-
tice—whatever it may be at that time. In future iterations of failure
(and even in its impending arrival), all savvy players should expect
that, if the political will can be mustered, they may experience (by
their own design or otherwise) a set of rules governing their reorga-
nization or windup that are totally different from those of whatever
bankruptcy system is then in effect. Today’s examples of such justi-
fications for veering from established rules include those businesses
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said to be ‘‘too big to fail’’ because of the ways in which they are
networked with the rest of our economy and those that impact
consumers who are too small to fail because they don’t have enough
overall wealth. Because most companies in a well-functioning econ-
omy do business with many other companies as well as with a large
number of consumer purchasers, investors, borrowers, or lenders
(either directly or indirectly), the precedent being set by the emer-
gency actions makes most businesses into credible candidates for
treatment outside bankruptcy in the future.
In fact, the government’s decision to bail out Bear Stearns left
many at Lehman, who expected similar treatment, to stand on the
sidelines too long as bankruptcy neared. By the time these private
actors realized Lehman would be left to go bankrupt, it was too late
for them to implement many of the steps they could have taken to
mitigate the resulting mayhem. (Despite getting off on the wrong
foot, the Lehman bankruptcy managed to move quickly once
begun, with Barclays able to buy up the failed firm’s brokerage
assets within the first week after the filing.)
Although the bankruptcy system, like all legal systems, can bene-
fit from ongoing debate and evolution, it would be unwise to sim-
ply kill it off absent thoughtful discussion and good reason. Our
leaders must exercise restraint when taking actions that will crowd
out those who are adept at swooping into a failing or failed enter-
prise to turn things around or at least wind things up productively.
When taking such steps they must also credibly delineate why ordi-
nary bankruptcy rules are not being applied in a way that leaves
ample room for our bankruptcy system to continue to operate with
credibility in the future.
A  S C P
The central political problem faced by the Obama administration is
that it doesn’t want to overpay or to be the only one to blame if
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things go badly. Thus, it needs prominent partners from the private
financial sector, who, however, have every reason not to participate.
Why get into a partnership with someone who has mixed goals?
The business of the private actors in our financial system is to make
money by paying as low a price as possible for the assets in question
and then reselling those assets at a higher price. The government
(under administrations of either political stripe) is not out to make
money, meaning its goals are hugely complicated and subject to
change. In fact, the government has an incentive to overpay (as
discussed above) because it wants to avoid leaving the banks under-
capitalized and thus having to launch yet another program to pur-
chase bank shares.
So how can the government gain political participation? It needs
to get important groups in the private sector with large blocks of
both political and economic power to decide to act in a coordinated
fashion. And it needs to do so with enough self restraint that the
fundamental rules of the game won’t continue to change. We think
this is all possible by focusing on mechanisms others have suggested
for directly working through the core economic problems underly-
ing the present crisis.
The most central economic problem of the current crisis is the
large number of mortgages facing foreclosure that are held by ordi-
nary citizens stretched too thin to adequately address their existing
mortgage payments, especially in the face of declining home values.
Estimates put the total number of such mortgages in the millions,
covering a total amount of bad debt in the trillions of dollars. The
prospect of carrying out so many foreclosures seems practically
daunting and socially devastating. The people who own those
homes face crushing challenges on the most human level. The
financial entities that hold the mortgage notes and the many com-
plex derivative instruments based on these notes appear to be carry-
ing such huge losses on their books that they are unable to attract
the new infusions of investment they need to enable them to con-
tribute to the flows of financial credit the economy needs.
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Not all these bad mortgages are of equal toxicity; many could
be carried if a productive arrangement could be worked out. The
uncertainty over sorting these out, however, is a significant factor
driving down overall book values of banks.
Getting all these bad mortgages quickly and productively restruc-
tured or settled out involves a massive coordination problem,
requiring participation by workout experts, mortgage holders,
debtors, and owners of the derivative instruments. Clear rules that
let all interested parties know that they must deal with one another
and on what terms are the best way to get the needed collective
action started and continued. Although the existing legal system,
including contract law, property law, and bankruptcy law, provides
an adequate framework, for reasons explored above, the chance that
many of these rules will change freezes actors in place or encourages
them to perhaps take steps that might help themselves but decrease
the size of the overall pie. This means that the ongoing uncertainty
associated with future commitments to act boldly is itself a factor
contributing to the ongoing problem.
Furthermore, even immediately implementing some of the pro-
posed reforms could be almost as risky. Consider for example the
proposal to allow individual bankruptcy judges more leeway to
cram down on the finance community on a case by case basis a
lower amount than is due under existing loan contracts. First, put-
ting these millions of cases through full-blown litigation is unlikely
to increase the coordination speed. Second, for reasons explored
above, such bold changes in bankruptcy law leave those who need
to make new investments uncertain of the rules under which their
deals will be judged. Third, it presumes that judges will be best able
to figure out which mortgages can be productively carried by their
debtors, even after restructuring, and which ones can still lead to
serious failures.
In contrast, the ranks of professionals who are adept at turning
things around or unwinding things can help, quickly and effec-
tively, leveraging the private information held by the debtors, credi-
tors, and others who are involved in each deal. If additional work
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is needed to bring all parties together quickly, then a proposal other
than new power for bankruptcy judges might be in order. As sug-
gested by Charlie Calomiris, the government could commit to bear-
ing a percentage—perhaps 30 percent—of all write-downs reached
by private agreement between the affected parties within a specified
period of time, say six months. During the 1999 implementation in
Mexico of the ‘‘Punto Final’’ (Final Point) program, private-sector
actors came together quickly to take advantage of just such a joint
subsidy approach. That joint subsidy approach would not only
facilitate the needed coordination, but would also subsidize both
the suffering home owners and the cash-strapped banks. At the
same time, it would avoid both crowding out the professionals and
scaring off those needed to invest in the reworked deals.
C
We recognize that many interesting ideas for short-term fixes to our
present financial crisis have been offered. Not having endeavored to
provide a thorough account of everything that has been written or
tried on this important issue, we offer instead a single overarching
point with a few practical implications that we fear have been
largely overlooked during both the end of the Bush administration
and the beginning of the Obama administration. Our hope is that
pointing them out will help; once noticed they can be significantly
mitigated at a low cost relative to the other approaches on offer. At
bottom, we think it important for the government to very soon
pick one set of institutions, and then stick to whatever it selects; for
we fear that the costs of the uncertainties caused by ongoing change
outweigh whatever benefits may come from tinkering further.
Along the way, we pointed out one particular risk raised by present
approaches, which is crowding out the many professionals in our
private sector—consultants, financiers, lawyers, managers, and so
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on—who are expert at stepping into failed businesses and rework-
ing or winding up affairs in a way that will redeploy assets toward
more productive uses. Another risk is eliminating through the
backdoor, and probably by accident, the ability for our well-estab-
lished rules of bankruptcy to form the backdrop against which
ongoing investments can be made. Although the bankruptcy system
is far from perfect and discussions for improvement are encour-
aged, tolling the death of bankruptcy at a time when new invest-
ments are most needed is not the best approach.
